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NOTES AND COMMENT
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tion of income or the management, conservation or maintenance, of
income producing property.6 7 Later decisions have indicated that the
expenses of defending a business which is per se illegal, as distinguished
from a legal business operated in an illegal manner, are not deductible,
68
and any holding to the contrary would frustrate public policy.
LEwis F. CAMP, JR.

Mortgages-Agency-Power of Dealer to Bind Owner by MortgageIndicia of Ownership-Automobile Title Certificates
There has been a practice among used-car dealers in purchasing
automobiles to receive title certificates with the assignment form on the
reverse side merely signed by the assignor-seller but blank as to the
assignee-car dealer. Later when the automobile is resold, the new
owner's name is entered in the blank as assignee; and there is an anonymous notarization of the original seller's signature. Thus, the transaction is represented as one solely between the original seller and the new
owner, concealing the intermediate ownership of the used-car dealer in
direct contravention of the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Registration

Act. 1
Since a sale of personal property is not required to be evidenced by
any written instrument in order to be valid, it has been held in North
Carolina that there may be a transfer of title to an automobile without
complying with the registration statute which requires a transfer and
delivery of a certificate of title. 2 Therefore, it seems that a buyer may
get good title from a dealer who is an actual owner whether he holds an
incomplete title certificate or no certificate at all. The aforementioned
practice of receiving blank title certificates may, however, mislead third
parties where a dealer is not the actual owner but a limited agent.
8
Such was the situation in Hawkins v. M & I Finance Corp. In
this case the plaintiff, owner of an automobile, delivered his car and title
certificate, with the assignment form on the reverse side blank as to the

'7 Commissioner v. Josephs, 168 F. 2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948); Commissioner v.
Heide, 165 F. 2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948). These cases held that a casual trustee could
not deduct the expenses incurred in defending against a charge of breach of duty
as a trustee. It would be difficult to reconcile these cases with Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945).
Thomas v. Commissioner, 18 T. C. 1417 (1951); Stralla v. Commissioner,
"R
9 T. C. 801 (1947).
'N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 20-72 et seq. (1953).

Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414
(1925). In this case P had an unrecorded conditional sale on an automobile which
X sold "free of encumbrance" to D. X violated the Motor Vehicle Registration Act
by not endorsing and delivering the title certificate to D. The title certificate
showed the outstanding conditional sale. P claimed that title could not pass to D
without a compliance with the statute. Held: title passed to D. P should have
recorded his conditional sale in order to put D on notice of the encumbrance.
238 N. C. 174, 77 S. E. 2d 669 (1953).
2 Carolina
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assignee but signed by the assignor-owner, to a used-car dealer for
resale. Instead the dealer exceeded his actual authority to sell and
mortgaged the car to the defendant finance company, which loaned
money on the car relying on the trade practice among car dealers as
showing that title had been transferred to the dealer by the transfer of
the certificate signed in blank. The owner was allowed to recover his
car from the mortgagee, the court holding that: (1) the dealer authorized merely to sell had no implied authority to mortgage the car; and
(2) the defendant-mortgagee could not rely on this trade practice and
the blank title certificate as indicating ownership in the dealer so as to
estop the real owner from claiming his title. On this latter point the
court said:
These practices may not be used as a basis for invoking the doctrine of estoppel. To permit such would be to legalize by indirection this practice of suppressing notice of intermediate dealer
ownership as well as the companion practice of anonymous notarization of transfer certificates, and thereby override the salutary
procedure fixed by statute for the prevention and suppression of
the very type of fraud and chicanery with which we are at grips
in the instant case. The public policy of this State as fixed by
these statutes may not be put to naught in such manner. The
4
principles of equity will not permit.
When there is a sale or mortgage by a person not the owner, as in
the Hawkins case, the rights of the owner as against the buyer or mortgagee may depend on: (1) whether the person selling or mortgaging
is an agent of the owner;r or (2) whether such person may legally be
6
treated as an owner.
In dealing with the person as an agent, one may rely on the implied
or apparent authority of the agent, i.e., that which the principal holds
his agent out to the world as having. It is elemental that no authority
to sell should be inferred from the mere possession of goods. 7 Where,
'Id. at 184, 77 S. E. 2d at 677.
' Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211 Pac. 267 (1922) ; Spooner v. Cummings, 151 Mass. 313, 23 N. E. 839 (1890); Stockyards Nat. Bank of South
Omaha v. Harris Wool Co., 316 Mo. 426, 289 S. W. 623 (1926) ; Atlantic Discount
Corp. v. Young, 224 N. C. 89, 29 S. E. 2d 29 (1944); Southern Ry. v. W. A.
Simpkins Co., 178 N. C. 273, 100 S. E. 418 (1919) ; Mahar v. White, 190 Okla.
434, 124 P. 2d 260 (1942); Brown Bros. & Co. v. The William Clark Co., 22 R. I.
36, 46 AtI. 239 (1900) ; Zerr v. Howell, 84 S. W. 2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Rogers v. Whitney, 91 Vt. 79, 99 Atl. 419 (1916).
'Rapp v. Fred W. Hauger Motors Co., 77 Cal. App. 417, 246 Pac. 1067 (1926);
Bailey v. Hoover, 233 Ky. 681, 26 S. W. 2d 522 (1930); Ruddy v. Oregon Auto.
Credit Corp., 179 Ore. 688, 174 P. 2d 603 (1946) ; Commercial Finance Corp. v.
Burke, 173 Ore. 341, 145 P. 2d 473 (1944) ; Scruggs v. Crockett Auto. Co., 41 S. W.
2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Boice v. Finance Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591
(1920).

'Pacific Accept. Corp. v. Bank of Italy, 59 Cal. App. 76, 209 Pac. 1024 (1922)
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however, in addition to possession by a limited agent, the owner has
given such evidence of authority to sell as usually accompanies such
authority according to the custom of trade, this is evidence, not that he
is the owner, but that he has received authority from the owner to sell.8
Illustrative of this latter situation is Carterv. Rowley,9 where an owner
left his automobile with a dealer to "find" a purchaser. Instead the
dealer sold to an innocent purchaser. There was evidence that: (1) the
owner had left his car in the possession of a dealer in secondhand cars;
(2) the dealer's premises were surrounded with conspicuous signs advertising used-cars for sale; and (3) the owner knew the dealer's line
of business. The court held that such circumstances, in addition to
possession, according to the custom of trade and general understanding
of businessmen indicated an authority in the dealer to consummate a
sale.
Once an authority to sell is established there arises the question what
other incidental authority exists by implication. Generally, the authority
to sell confers authority to fix any terms and conditions necessary to
the sale ;1O but it does not ordinarily include the power to -sellon credit,"
to exchange or barter, 12 or to pledge or mortgage.' 8 Consequently, in
situations such as that in the Hawkins case, courts seem reluctant to
extend protection, solely on the basis of an implied agency, to the mortgagee of a dealer with authority limited to selling. 14
Where a real owner has clothed an agent with indicia of title and
such title is relied on by an innocent purchaser, the purchaser may prevail, not on the basis of the agent's apparent authority to represent anyOverland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley, 152 La. 622, 94 So. 138 (1922) - Hawkins v.
M & J Finance Corp., 238 N. C. 174, 178, 77 S. E. 2d 669, 672 (1953) ; Handley
Motor Co., Inc. v. Wood, 237 N. C. 318, 323, 75 S.E. 2d 312, 316 (1953) ; American
Exchange Nat. Bank v. Winder, 198 N. C. 18, 21, 150 S. E. 489, 491 (1929);
Hedges v. Burke, 147 Tenn. 247, 247 S. W. 91 (1923).
s Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211 Pac. 267 (1922) ; Atlantic Discount
Corp. v. Young, 224 N. C. 89, 29 S. E. 2d 29 (1944) ; Mahar v. White, 190 Okla.
434, 124 P. 2d 260 (1942).
959 Cal. App. 486, 211 Pac. 267 (1922).
"0Powell v. King Lumber Co., 168 N. C. 632, 84 S. E. 1032 (1915); Daniel v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 136 N. C. 517, 48 S. E. 816 (1904); TIFFANY,
AGENCY § 32 (2nd ed. 1924).
"' Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 57 S.E. 575 (1907) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 65
(1934).
"2Davison v. Parks, 79 N. H. 262, 108 Atl. 288 (1919); MECHEM OUTLINES
OF AGENCY §§ 262-267 (3rd ed. 1923).
"'Pacific Finance Corp. v. Hendley, 119 Cal. App. 697, 7 P. 2d 391 (1932);
Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., 230 Minn. 469, 42 N. W. 2d 54 (1950); 2
WILLISTON, SALES §317 (Rev. ed. 1948).
1,Coolbaugh v. Atlantic Motor Finance Co., 101 N. J. L. 215, 128 Atl. 595
(1925); National Guarantee & Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Co., 124 Ohio 34, 176
N. E. 678 (1931). But cf. Bauer v. Commercial Credit Co., 163 Wash. 210, 300
Pac. 1049 (1931), where estoppel was applicable and a mortgagee prevailed against
an owner. 45 HARv. L. REv. 375 (1931).
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one, but on his apparent ownership. 15 In this situation the real owner
by his misleading actions is estopped to claim his title. That the real
owner thus clothes the agent means that the indicia of title must emanate
from the owner with his consent or knowledge as distinguished from
indicia feloniously created or obtained, as by forgery.'( The real owner
may be estopped to claim his title where he entrusts possession plus a
certain document-automobile title certificate 17 or bill of sale.'"
Where an automobile title certificate is relied on as an indicium of
ownership, according to the Hawkins decision, it must be full and complete on its face when received by a third party. North Carolina seems
to be in accord with the weight of authority which holds that an incomplete title certificate is not only insufficient indicium of ownership, but
is constructive notice of want of title. 19 But where a dealer is entrusted
with possession of an owner's automobile and certificate of title with
the assignment form on the reverse side blank as to the assignee but
signed by the assignor-owner, and the dealer completes the instrument
so there are no patent defects, it has been held that a third party may
rely on the certificate as indicium of title and treat the dealer as an
20
owner.
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM

Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591 (1920). See
also, San Joaquin Valley Securities Co. v. Harris, 123 Cal. App. 774, 11 P. 2d 49
(1932), illustrating that as indicia of ownership must be coupled with possession,
so must possession be coupled with such indicia.

"Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243 Mass. 143, 137 N. E. 531 (1922). Where
the wrongdoer obtains the possession of the certificates of title, ownership, or registration, not by the voluntary act, or with the acquiescence or knowledge of the
owner, but by theft or forgery, considerations requiring the invocation of the doctrine of estoppel against the owner are lacking, since the evidences of ownership
having been secured by the felonious acts of the wrongdoer, the owner has done
nothing to mislead third persons purchasing the property from the wrongdoer on
the assumption of his ownership thereof.
'Washington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. McGuire, 213 Cal. 13, 1 P. 2d 437
(1931).
" Bailey v. Hoover, 233 Ky. 681, 26 S. W. 2d 522 (1930).
"A. C. Nelson Auto Sales, Inc. v. Turner, 241 Iowa 927, 44 N. W. 2d 36
(1950); Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., 230 Minn. 469, 42 N. W. 2d 54
(1950) ; Pearl v. Interstate Securities Co., 357 Mo. 160, 206 S. W. 2d 975 (1947) ;
Erwin v. Southwestern Investment Co., 147 Tex. 260, 215 S. W. 2d 330 (1948).
See, Wilson v. Commercial Finance Co., 239 N. C. 349, 358, 359, 71 S. E. 2d 908,
915, 916 (1954), where the court stated that under the law of Virginia an automobile
registration card would not constitute an indicium of title because the sole evidence
of the ownership of a motor vehicle is the certificate of title. The court also said
that ignoring the law of Virginia, in this case, the registration card would not be an
indicium of title since the notice of transfer form on the reverse side of the card
was blank and unsigned.
201Commercial Finance Corp. v. Burke, 173 Ore. 341, 145 P. 2d 473 (1944).

